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Team Production Theory and Private Company Boards 
Elizabeth Pollman* 
INTRODUCTION 
What is a corporation? Who owns it? Why do corporations have a 
board of directors, and what is its role? These time-enduring questions, 
and their variations, have provided the frame on which corporate law 
scholarship has been built and rebuilt over time. 
As the story goes, by the late 1990s, the principal–agent view of the 
corporation had come to dominate corporate law scholarship. This model 
views public corporations as assets owned by shareholders (principals) 
who hire directors and officers (agents) to manage the assets on their be-
half.1 Corporate law, in this model, is understood as a solution to the 
agency-cost problem that arises from the diverging interests of principals 
and agents, and the primary goal of the corporation is understood to be 
maximizing shareholder wealth. 
In their path-breaking article, A Team Production Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout showed that alterna-
tive economic problems also provide insight into the nature and function 
of the public corporation and corporate law.2 Their focus was on team 
production—which they describe as situations where two or more indi-
viduals or groups are making team-specific inputs of investment and ef-
fort—and the gains from such team production are nonseparable.3 Team 
                                                        
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. This Essay was prepared for the 
Berle VI Symposium held at Seattle University School of Law. Thanks to Chuck O’Kelley, the 
Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society, and the Seattle University Law Review. 
Thanks also to symposium participants, Afra Afsharipour, Brian Broughman, and Michael Guttentag 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 2. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production]. 
 3. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Intro-
duction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 744–45 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Introduction]; see also Armen 
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (discussing team production). 
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production can give rise to problems in determining how to divide eco-
nomic surpluses generated by the team. Agreements made ex ante about 
how to divide the surpluses, before they are generated, invite shirking, 
whereas ex post divisions create incentives for opportunistic, rent-
seeking behavior.4 
Blair and Stout argued that the “otherwise puzzling arrangement” 
of the board of directors in a corporation can be understood as a solution 
to this team production problem.5 That is, a public corporation is “a nex-
us of team-specific assets invested by shareholders, managers, employees, 
and others who hope to profit from team production.”6 Team members 
who cannot easily contract with each other over how to divide the gains 
of team production agree to leave that decision, and control over the cor-
porate assets, to the board of directors.7 Thus, according to Blair and 
Stout, the corporation, a legal entity, holds the assets and the board of 
directors serves as a “mediating hierarchy,” or trustee, for the firm as a 
whole.8 This mediating hierarchy encourages firm-specific investments 
from team members and helps to reduce the shirking and opportunistic 
behavior that would otherwise arise if the team members divided the sur-
pluses themselves.9 Further, the authors presented the mediating hierar-
chy model of the public corporation as providing theoretical support for 
arguments against the shareholder wealth maximization norm and an un-
derstanding of shareholders as owners.10 
While Blair and Stout provided a dramatically different view of the 
corporation from the conventional principal–agent account, they also 
delineated limitations to their proposed theory.  Most importantly, they 
noted that the mediating hierarchy model “applies primarily to public—
not private—corporations.”11 They explained this caveat by contrasting 
the widely dispersed share ownership of public corporations, which frees 
directors from the control of the shareholders, executives, and employees, 
with the concentrated stock ownership of private corporations.12 In pri-
vate corporations, “stock ownership is usually concentrated in the hands 
of a small number of investors who not only select and exercise tight 
                                                        
 4. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 249. 
 5. Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 3, at 746. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 281. 
 12. Id. 
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control over the board, but also are themselves involved in managing the 
firm as officers and directors.”13 
This Essay, prepared for the Berle VI Symposium, takes the stated 
limitations of Blair and Stout’s work as a starting point and examines 
whether the team production theory, particularly the mediating hierarchy 
model of the board of directors, is indeed inapplicable to private corpora-
tions. After describing the boards of both startup corporations and other 
private corporations, this Essay explores how the public–private line of 
the model’s stated applicability is not as clear or impermeable as origi-
nally suggested. The mediating hierarchy model is reflected in certain 
private corporations and might in fact find some of its clearest expression 
in the evolution of startup companies.14 The main contribution of this 
Essay is thus to show that Blair and Stout’s theory need not be limited to 
public corporations. While the board of directors does not act as a medi-
ating hierarchy in all corporations, this Essay shows that the board can 
solve a team production problem in private as well as public corporations. 
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I discusses Blair and Stout’s 
team production theory of corporate law, with its mediating hierarchy 
model, and their caveat that it is a theory of public—not private—
corporations. Part II provides an overview of private company boards of 
directors. Part III analyzes the following ways in which the team produc-
tion theory and mediating hierarchy model fits, as a descriptive matter, 
with certain private company boards of directors: the “hiring” of the 
board, the use of independent directors, and the mediating role. Further, 
Part III examines why some, but not all, private corporations reflect the 
mediating hierarchy model. 
                                                        
 13. Id. 
 14. Conversely, for an argument that “in a large number of U.S. corporations, boards of direc-
tors do not function as truly autonomous ‘outsiders,’ capable of mediating disputes between manag-
ers and other corporate constituencies,” see John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating 
Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 864 (1999). Fur-
ther exploration of how some public company boards may not act as disinterested mediating hierar-
chies could also prove valuable in understanding the limits of Blair and Stout’s team production 
theory and mediating hierarchy model. For example, public corporations with a dual class share 
voting structure, such as Google and Facebook, allow for founders and insiders to maintain control 
of the board of directors even though they may no longer own a majority of the corporation’s stock. 
See, e.g., Stephen I. Glover & Aarthy S. Thamodaran, Debating the Pros and Cons of Dual Class 
Capital Structures, 27 INSIGHTS, no. 3, Mar. 2013, at 10, available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
publications/Documents/GloverThamodaran-DualClassCapitalStructures.pdf. 
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I. THE TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW AND ITS 
STATED LIMITATIONS 
Blair and Stout’s theory of corporate law starts with the team pro-
duction problem and their observation that we can understand the corpo-
rate board of directors as a solution to this problem.15 To better under-
stand their theory and stated limitations, it is useful to briefly review the 
foundations of their analysis. 
Returning to the original literature Blair and Stout traced, we start 
with Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, who defined team production 
as production in which: “1) several types of resources are used . . . 2) the 
product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating re-
source . . . [and] 3) not all resources used in team production belong to 
one person.”16 We can imagine as an example of team production, a 
group of researchers who each make a different, nonseparable contribu-
tion in developing a new drug.17 Alchian and Demsetz pointed out that 
team production poses contracting difficulties because, if team members 
agree on a specific profit allocation in advance, they may shirk, and if 
they agree to allocate profits after production, they may engage in waste-
ful rent-seeking and opportunistic behavior.18 Alchian and Demsetz ar-
gued that one solution is to create a hierarchy in which one person inhab-
its the role of monitor, receiving the residual profits and making sure that 
no one shirks, while all other team members become employees who are 
paid a fixed wage.19 In this model, the employees have no incentive to 
engage in rent-seeking behavior because they are paid fixed wages, and 
the monitor has an incentive to prevent shirking because the monitor re-
ceives the residual profits. 
Other scholars developed and refined Alchian and Demsetz’s work 
on the team production problem. Bengt Holmstrom showed that a con-
tract for team production cannot be written that both prevents shirking 
and allocates all of the joint output to the team members.20 He suggested 
that one solution to this contracting problem is to agree that an outsider, 
without control rights, will “break the budget” by absorbing any surplus 
not distributed to the team members.21 He argued that his model provided 
a rationale for the separation of ownership and labor in firms, as the 
                                                        
 15. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 257–58. 
 16. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 779. 
 17. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 265. 
 18. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 779–81. 
 19. Id. at 781. 
 20. See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982). 
 21. Id. at 325. 
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shareholders could be understood as the outside budget breakers and the 
executives and employees as the team members. 22  Subsequently, 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales modeled the team production prob-
lem with the additional specification that team members are making a 
firm-specific investment—a commitment of resources that is specific to 
that particular firm or that cannot be revoked once committed.23 Rajan 
and Zingales recognized that to incentivize team members to make such 
a firm-specific investment, it would be important to allow them to share 
in the surplus generated and to assure them that shirking and rent-seeking 
would be controlled.24  They suggested that the team members might 
therefore realize that it is in their own best interests to give up control 
rights to a hierarch that could control shirking and rent-seeking among 
team members and would be awarded a nominal share of the team’s out-
put.25 Rajan and Zingales, like Holmstrom before them, interpreted their 
findings as a rationale for the separation of ownership from labor in a 
corporation. 
Blair and Stout’s theory built on this work by substituting the cor-
poration itself in the role of the budget breaker or hierarch, arguing that 
shareholders, executives, and employees are all team members.26 The 
corporation is the repository for the residual returns. It has a separate le-
gal identity, and it protects and encourages firm-specific investments 
from several different groups who find it difficult to explicitly contract 
for team production.27 The board of directors is the internal governance 
structure in the corporation that embodies this solution—corporate law 
requires that a board of directors be given authority to make decisions for 
the corporation. Blair and Stout argued the board could be characterized 
as a “mediating hierarchy” because an important function of the board is 
“encouraging firm-specific investment in team production by mediating 
disputes among team members about the allocation of duties and re-
wards.”28 
After setting out this view of the corporation, which they termed the 
“mediating hierarchy model,” Blair and Stout explicitly limited the scope 
of its descriptive power.29 They provided the caveat that “the model ap-
                                                        
 22. Id. at 325, 338–39. 
 23. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in the Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 
387, 392 (1998). 
 24. Id. at 422–24. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 269. 
 27. Id. at 275. 
 28. Id. at 278. 
 29. Id. at 281. 
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plies primarily to public—not private—corporations.”30 This limitation 
was, naturally, not itself the focus of their groundbreaking article, so they 
did not fully explore it. Rather, the limitation seemed to stem from the 
authors’ intuition that the wide dispersion of stock ownership in public 
corporations is what makes the mediating hierarchy model fit as a de-
scriptive matter, in contrast with the concentrated stock ownership of 
private corporations in which the small number of investors have control 
over the board and manage the firm.31 
The Blair and Stout article also briefly situates team production 
theory in the life cycle of the corporation, stating “that the choice to ‘go 
public’ may be driven in part by team production considerations.”32 The 
authors illustrate this point by noting that when an individual or a small 
group of people starts a business, they typically prefer to keep the com-
pany private, but in time, when they seek outside investors or profession-
al managers, “the original entrepreneurs may conclude that it is in their 
best interest to opt into the mediating hierarchy model by going pub-
lic.”33 And, further, the authors assert that “an independent board is what 
makes a public corporation a public corporation.”34 
While the Blair and Stout article situates team production theory 
and the mediating hierarchy model on the public side, it also refers to 
private and closely held corporations as “alternative” or “other” organi-
zational forms.35 The article thus paints a picture of public and private 
corporations as situated not so much on a spectrum, but rather as differ-
ent business forms, with private corporations choosing to become public 
once they need a mediating hierarchy model because of outside invest-
ment or management. 
                                                        
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.; cf. Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1051, 1055 (2013) (“I pause to note that I confine my remarks to public companies only, and to 
those without a dominant shareholder. The private firm is a horse of a different color. It often has 
few independent directors, and frequently large shareholders serve both as board members and exec-
utives.”). 
 32. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 281. 
 33. Id. (“In other words, rational entrepreneurs prefer doing business as a private firm when 
team production inefficiencies are less of a problem, either because one individual’s or group’s firm-
specific investment is more critical to the enterprise’s success than any other’s, or because there are 
relatively few obstacles to explicit contracting over the division of any surplus.”). 
 34. Id. at 251; see also id. at 276 (“When disputes arise, however, they want a decisionmaking 
procedure in place that all believe will be fair. The solution? They form a public corporation.”). 
 35. Id. at 249 (referring to privately held corporations as “[o]ther organizational forms”); id. at 
276 (“Yet if all the potential value of an enterprise truly emanated from the firm-specific investment 
of a specific individual, why would that individual need to form a public corporation to hire workers 
and expand production? Presumably, she could use simple employment contracts or adopt an alter-
native business form such as a limited partnership or closely held company.”). 
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Does this limitation of team production theory to public corpora-
tions make sense? In what ways do private corporation boards resemble a 
mediating hierarchy? These questions are useful for exploring the 
boundaries of the team production theory and the mediating hierarchy 
model, as well as more generally inquiring into the role and institutional 
value of centralized management in private corporations. To begin to 
answer these questions, we can turn to an investigation of the boards of 
directors of private corporations. 
II.  PRIVATE COMPANY BOARDS 
Our inquiry into private company boards begins by more precisely 
pinpointing the subject of examination. The first observation to make is 
that the line between what corporate law scholars typically refer to as 
“private” and “public” corporations is drawn by federal securities laws.    
A company becomes subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and its public reporting requirements by listing securities on a na-
tional securities exchange, by making a registered public offering under 
the Securities Act of 1933, or by triggering registration requirements un-
der section 12(g) of the Exchange Act.36 The third path or trigger came 
about in 1964 when Congress enacted section 12(g) to mandate disclo-
sures from companies with “sufficiently active trading markets and pub-
lic interest.”37 Motivated by the policy goal of protecting investors, Con-
gress used company assets and the number of shareholders of record as a 
proxy for determining which companies were of a sufficient size to re-
quire public status.38 Congress recently raised this threshold in the JOBS 
Act, such that a company with total assets exceeding $10 million and a 
class of equity security held by 2,000 or more shareholders of record 
must register under the Exchange Act.39 Thus, “private” corporations are 
those that have not become public by one of these three distinct paths 
established by federal securities laws.40 
                                                        
 36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), 780(d) (2012). 
 37. Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 23,407, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,369 (July 
14, 1986). 
 38. Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the 
Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 166–68 (2013). 
 39. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 
306, 325 (2012). To be precise, the JOBS Act increased section 12(g)’s threshold to 2,000, provided 
that no more than 499 of those shareholders are unaccredited investors. The Act refers to accredited 
status as a term defined by the SEC. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2013). 
 40. For a discussion of regulatory and technological changes that have facilitated liquidity and 
capital formation outside of an exchange listing or public offering, see Donald C. Langevoort & 
Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 
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Within the realm of private corporations, there are, broadly speak-
ing, two types, although not formally distinguished by the law: (1) 
“startup” corporations, founded with the goal of creating innovative 
products or services and a relatively quick financial pay off for the 
founders, employees, and investors who are typically angel investors and 
venture capitalists; and (2) businesses that operate through the corporate 
form for the various advantages that it offers, while not triggering the 
thresholds for becoming a publicly reporting corporation.41 Regarding 
the latter category, it is mainly composed of small corporations that often 
begin as family businesses,42 although some of the nation’s largest corpo-
rations are private corporations that do not fit the “startup” model.43 No-
table examples of such economically large private corporations include 
Cargill and Koch Industries, which each have annual revenues over $100 
billion and employees in the tens of thousands.44 Examples also include 
companies that have been once public but were then later taken private 
again, such as computer manufacturer Dell Inc.45 
With this brief situating of private corporations, this section now 
turns to examining the role and composition of their boards of directors. 
A.  Startup Boards 
By their nature, startup companies develop from very early stage 
corporations—from formation itself, to seed funding and product devel-
opment, early commercialization, expansion, and then an “exit” through 
an acquisition, an initial public offering (IPO), or a failure of the business 
and liquidation.46 Through these stages, and as companies grow in size 
                                                                                                                            
GEO. L.J. 337 (2013); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
179 (2012). 
 41. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific 
Assets and Minority Oppression in the Close Corporation, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 916 (1999). 
 42. Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 
1192 (2013). 
 43 . See America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/largest-
private-companies/list/ (last visited May 15, 2014). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.; Connie Guglielmo, Dell Officially Goes Private: Inside the Nastiest Tech Buyout Ever, 
FORBES (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2013/10/30/you-wont-have-
michael-dell-to-kick-around-anymore/. For work exploring the “going-private phenomenon,” see 
generally 76 U. CHI. L. REV., No. 1, Winter 2009. 
 46. WORKING GRP. ON DIR. ACCOUNTABILITY & BD. EFFECTIVENESS, A SIMPLE GUIDE TO THE 
BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF VC-BACKED COMPANY DIRECTORS 1 (2007) [hereinafter VC-BACKED 
COMPANY DIRECTORS WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_ 
docman&task=doc_view&gid=78&Itemid=584. 
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and invested capital, the board of directors will typically also grow and 
change in composition.47 
At corporate formation, many startup corporations choose to incor-
porate in Delaware, which simply requires that the board consist of one 
or more members.48 Thus, the board of directors for a young startup 
company may simply be one founder CEO or a couple founders who de-
cide to start the company together.49 A few early employees may join the 
company and be awarded stock options for common stock as incentive 
compensation.50 The corporation could exist with this structure, with a 
one or two person/founder board, for months or even years, particularly 
if its funding comes from angel investors in the form of venture debt, 
convertible notes, or common stock.51 The board, at this stage, is more of 
a paperwork formality than a functioning governing body. As one source 
explains, “Lots of entrepreneurs don’t want to be hassled by a board of 
directors early on. The entrepreneurs want to control the company, don’t 
want to be responsible to a board, or don’t want to waste time communi-
cating with board members.”52 
At a certain point, however, startup corporations need more capital 
to bring a product to market and grow the company. Startups then typi-
cally raise venture capital financing in the form of convertible preferred 
stock that comes with liquidation preferences.53 Venture capitalists and 
venture capital firms (VC) are based on a model of raising funds of pri-
vate equity that the VCs use for investing in startup companies.54 The 
                                                        
 47. Id. 
 48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2014). 
 49. See VC-BACKED COMPANY DIRECTORS WHITE PAPER, supra note 46, at 1 (“Privately held 
[VC-backed] boards have a very high percentage of inexperienced corporate directors. First-time 
entrepreneurs who become founding CEOs frequently become corporate directors even before they 
obtain their first institutional round of venture capital financing.”). 
 50. BRAD FELD & MAHENDRA RAMSINGHANI, STARTUP BOARDS: GETTING THE MOST OUT OF 
YOUR BOARD OF DIRECTORS 11 (2014). 
 51. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169 (2010) [here-
inafter Ibrahim, Debt as VC]; Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2008) (“Angel investors are wealthy individuals who personally 
finance the same high-risk, high-growth start-ups as venture capitalists but at an earlier stage.”); 
FENWICK & WEST LLP, 2012 SEED FINANCING SURVEY: INTERNET/DIGITAL MEDIA AND SOFTWARE 
INDUSTRIES 6–7 (2013), available at http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/2012_Seed_ 
Survey_Report.pdf (convertible noteholders were granted board seats in only 4% of financings). 
 52. FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 81 (“Often, entrepreneurs don’t build a board 
until they are forced to by their VCs when they raise their first financing round.”). 
 53. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1815, 1878 (2013); Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 461, 466 (2010). 
 54. See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2d ed. 
2004). 
628 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:619 
idea is to invest in a startup company and help it grow to the point that it 
can be taken public through an IPO or sold to a larger corporation for a 
significant return on the VC’s investment.55 A successful exit “then lets 
the venture fund distribute the proceeds to [its] investors, raise a new 
fund for future investment, and invest in the next generation of compa-
nies.”56 
VC investors have strong motivation to monitor their investments 
and help them grow. Entrepreneurs typically have superior information 
about the startup because of the technical novelty and complexity of the 
product or service, but at the same time they are often unskilled at man-
aging a growing business.57 How do VCs arrange for close monitoring 
and involvement to deal with these unique problems of investing in 
startups? They stage their investments58 and negotiate for control rights, 
such as veto rights over certain major transactions, and for seats on the 
board of directors.59 
As VCs continue to negotiate for seats on the board in each round 
of financing, VCs typically gain increasing voting power on the board 
over time.60  From the perspective of the entrepreneur, taking on VC 
money means that “it’s no longer your company—you are now working 
for somebody else. If you don’t perform, you will get fired.”61 
                                                        
 55. See generally Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1998, 
at 131, 132 (1988). 
 56 . NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2014 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION 
YEARBOOK 10 (2014), available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=257&Itemid=103. 
 57. Ibrahim, Debt as VC, supra note 51, at 1192. 
 58. See D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949 
(1999). 
 59. Ibrahim, Debt as VC, supra note 51, at 1193; D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Ven-
ture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 346 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Exit Structure]. 
 60. Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce Entrepreneurial 
Teams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1329–30 (2013); Smith, Exit Structure, supra 
note 59, at 327 (noting that a recent survey found that by the final stage of VC investment before an 
IPO, where sole control was exercised by either the common or the preferred, control was more 
often controlled by the preferred). Cf. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the 
False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 56 n.78 (2006) (noting that “[w]hile 
each of the . . . contracting techniques helps VC investors minimize agency risk, they also give rise 
to the possibility that the venture capitalist may use the contract rights opportunistically.”); Ronald J. 
Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1067, 1085 (2003) (“Reducing the agency costs of the entrepreneur’s discretion by transferring 
it to the venture capital fund also transfers to the venture capitalist . . . the opportunity to use that 
discretion opportunistically against the entrepreneur.”). 
 61. FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 12; see also id. at 81 (“Often, entrepreneurs don’t 
build a board until they are forced to by their VCs when they raise their first financing round.”). 
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The voting agreement may provide not only for a board seat or 
seats for the VC investors, but also for the specific allocation of board 
seats among representatives of the common shareholders (the manage-
ment and employees), the preferred shareholders (the VC investors), and 
an independent director or directors either mutually appointed by the 
common and preferred shareholders or voted on together as a single 
class.62 There is no firm rule regarding board sizes and seat allocations,63 
but the following are typical over the life cycle of a startup corporation 
that takes on VC investment. In the early stages of the corporation, the 
board is often composed of three to five directors total, representing one 
to two management seats, one to three VC seats, and zero to two inde-
pendent seats.64 Through the later stages of the startup corporation, the 
board typically increases to between five to seven directors, representing 
one to two management seats, two to three VC seats, and two to three 
independent seats.65 As the company matures and nears a liquidity event 
of an IPO or acquisition, its board may consider naming a formal chair-
man, and establishing audit, compensation, and nominating/governance 
committees.66 The average time from VC financing to exit by an acquisi-
tion or an IPO is approximately seven and eight years, respectively.67 
Notably, many startup companies include independent directors on 
their boards, often in tiebreaking positions between the directors repre-
senting the entrepreneurs and investors.68 As noted above, VCs negotiate 
for board seats in order to monitor their investments and to play an active 
role in helping to grow the company. In addition, they negotiate for 
board seats to have voting power to further their own financial interests, 
particularly where they may diverge from those of the entrepreneurs.69 
Because VCs have timing pressures due to the terms of the funds they 
raise, and because they hold preferred stock rather than the common 
                                                        
 62. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 59, at 325–26; Broughman & Fried, supra note 60, at 
1329. Such a voting agreement overrides default statutory rules regarding shareholder voting for 
election of the board of directors. Id.; FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 52. 
 63. VC-BACKED COMPANY DIRECTORS WHITE PAPER, supra note 46, at 10. 
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.; see also FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 3, 8 (noting that venture capital-
backed boards are increasingly taking on the burden of adhering to public company compliance 
standards and best practices to improve their prospects for optimal liquidity events). 
 67. Mark Lennon, CrunchBase Reveals: The Average Successful Startup Raises $41M, Exits at 
$242.9M, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 14, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/12/14/crunchbase-reveals-the-
average-successful-startup-raises-41m-exits-at-242-9m/; NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra 
note 56, at 14. 
 68. Broughman & Fried, supra note 60, at 1329–30; Broughman, supra note 53, at 462. 
 69. Broughman, supra note 53, at 463–64; Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 59, at 318. 
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stock that the entrepreneurs typically hold, VCs may favor exit opportu-
nities that the common stockholders do not.70 For instance, “VCs may 
favor a quick exit and wish to avoid risky strategies that could benefit 
common stockholders.”71 In addition, potential conflict in VC-backed 
firms can stem from more than diverging interests between preferred 
stockholders and common stockholders. Entrepreneurs may also have 
diverging interests because they receive private benefits from running the 
company that are unrelated to the company’s value (e.g., the joy of being 
one’s own boss), and they may be inclined to decline exits or choose ex-
its that provide them with personal opportunities.72 The tension between 
the VCs’ financial interests and those of the entrepreneurs can play out in 
a variety of decisions aside from when and to whom to sell the company, 
such as whether to replace the CEO, how much to invest in developing a 
new technology, and so on.73 
Adding an independent director can help to settle disputes that may 
arise and serve as a “commitment mechanism” to force compromise be-
fore an actual conflict arises.74 Independent directors “are usually indus-
try experts and other outsiders whose experience and connections are 
expected to add value to the enterprise.”75 According to one study, VCs 
and entrepreneurs share control of the board with independent directors 
holding the tiebreaking vote 61% of the time, VCs control the board 25% 
of the time, and entrepreneurs control the board 14% of the time.76 In any 
                                                        
 70. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 48 (Del. Ch. 2013); Michael 
Klausner & Stephen Venuto, Liquidation Rights and Incentive Misalignment in Start-up Financing, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1433 (2013) (analyzing “how the accumulation of liquidation rights in 
venture capital financings can be detrimental to firm value, both because they can create conflicting 
interests among investors and because they can undermine the incentives of the management team”). 
 71. Broughman, supra note 53, at 463; see also FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 69 
(“However, at some point usually around the fourth or fifth year of the fund, there starts to be a 
series of forces that drive pressure for exits, including the desire of most firms to raise another fund 
in that time period. As a result, some VCs start to pressure the companies they are investors in to sell 
earlier than the entrepreneurs might otherwise desire, or accept an offer at an intermediate stage from 
a buyer for a successful outcome, but at a price much lower than the entrepreneurs believe the com-
pany will be worth in a few years.”). 
 72. See Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 59, at 318; Brian Broughman, Independent Directors 
and Shared Board Control in Venture Finance, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 42, 42–72 (2013). 
 73. Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 59, at 318. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 987 (2006). 
 76. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: 
An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 288 (2003); see also 
Steven N. Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy & Per Strömberg, Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the 
Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Companies, 64 J. 
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particular instance, however, it remains a fact-specific inquiry whether a 
so-called independent director is truly independent.77 Professors Jesse 
Fried and Mira Ganor have explained, “Because VCs often have consid-
erable influence over the common shareholder representatives on the 
board as well as the independent directors, the percentage of startup 
boards effectively controlled by VCs may well be much higher than a 
study of financing documents would suggest.”78 Selecting impartial, in-
dependent directors is a common topic of discussion in the startup com-
munity.79 
B. Other Private Company Boards 
This section now turns to examining the boards of directors of other 
private corporations, which is an inherently more difficult task. While 
there is a significant amount of literature and collected knowledge about 
the governance structures and practices in startup companies, that is not 
the case for other private corporations. The commonly referred to 
“startup community” is indeed actually a community of sorts—venture 
capital is relatively organized with well-established players and trade 
associations, and a great deal of startup activity has emerged, and contin-
ues to emerge, from Silicon Valley and the San Francisco Bay Area 
                                                                                                                            
FIN. 75, 99–103 (2009) (At the time of IPO, the median number of VC directors is three, the median 
number of management directors is two, and the median number of outside directors is two.). 
 77. See, e.g., Fried & Ganor, supra note 75, at 988–89; Smith, Exit Structure, supra note 59, at 
320 n.21; In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 54 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 78. Fried & Ganor, supra note 75, at 989. 
 79. See, e.g., Create A Board That Reflects the Ownership of the Company, VENTURE HACKS 
(Apr. 1, 2007), http://venturehacks.com/articles/board-structure (“Don’t let the investors control the 
board through the independent board seat . . . . The simplest solution to this dilemma is to fill the 
independent seat before the financing.”); Brad Feld, Expectations for Outside Board Members, FELD 
THOUGHTS (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.feld.com/archives/2014/04/expectations-outside-board-
members.html. Feld writes: 
I generally see three types of outside board members getting recruited to a board of a VC 
backed company:  
1. The friend of the VC . . . [;]  
2. The friend of the CEO / entrepreneur . . . [;]  
3. An independent director. Now, this person can be a friend of the VC, or a 
friend of the CEO / entrepreneur, but is an independent thinker. Or they might 
be someone from industry that is known to one of the investors or the entre-
preneur, but is recruited specifically by the CEO to join the board . . . . 
Note the emphasis on independent thinker. It doesn’t matter who the relationship origi-
nates from. 
Id. 
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where there are clusters of talent and supporting resources.80 By contrast, 
non-startup private corporations are not a part of a meaningful communi-
ty of similar organizations; what connects them is simply the choice of 
entity of the corporate form and their non-public status under federal se-
curities laws. Moreover, private corporations face no public disclosure 
obligations. 81  As a consequence, information about private company 
boards is relatively scarce. 
With that caveat in mind, we can first observe that private corpora-
tions are diverse—they may represent a single shareholder owner, or a 
family-owned or private equity-owned business, large or small. A survey 
by the National Association of Corporate Directors found the following 
diversity of private corporations: 
• 18% family-owned and managed 
• 13% family-owned but not family-managed 
• 22% investor-owned and managed 
• 17% investor-owned but non-investor managed 
• 30% other.82 
The boards of such private corporations likewise vary in their size 
and nature. They tend on the whole to be smaller and less independent 
than public company boards83 and more responsive to stakeholder re-
quest than public company peers.84 The boards of larger private compa-
nies tend to more closely resemble public company boards in their size 
and structure.85 But not all private corporations actually have an active, 
functioning board of directors. A recent survey of large private corpora-
tions averaging over $300 million in revenues found that only about 70% 
                                                        
 80. See, e.g., STARTUP REVOLUTION, http://www.startuprev.com/category/communities/ (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2014); Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
717, 723–32 (2010) (discussing the “Silicon Valley Ecosystem”). 
 81. Jennifer Johnson, What’s Good for the Goose? A Critical Essay on “Best Practices” for 
Private Firms, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 251, 264–65 (2007). 
 82. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., NACD PRIVATE COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY (2007). 
 83. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., NACD 2002 STUDY ON EFFECTIVE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BOARDS (2002) (finding that only 28% of private company directors were independent as compared 
with 66% of public company directors); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., 2013–2014 NACD 
PRIVATE COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY 12, 14 (noting the average public company has 8.6 direc-
tors versus 7.6 at the average private company and that “[o]nly 33 percent of private company 
boards with a non-independent chairman have a lead director, compared to more than 75 percent 
analogous public company boards”). 
 84 . NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., 2013–2014 NACD PRIVATE COMPANY GOVERNANCE 
SURVEY 38 (2013). 
 85. Id. at 5 (noting that “larger private companies (those with annual revenues greater than 
$250 million) tend to more closely resemble public companies in areas such as board size, commit-
tee structure, and subsidiary governance”). 
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of the corporations surveyed had “a formal board of directors” that meets 
quarterly or more frequently.86 Only about one-quarter of such large pri-
vate company directors are independent, outside directors.87 The compa-
ny’s CEO serves as chair in 71% of the private company boards sur-
veyed.88 
A recent survey of family-owned businesses found that 28% do not 
have a board of directors.89 Family-owned businesses that do have a 
board commonly report that it is dominated by family members. In fact, 
60% of those surveyed responded that family members constitute a ma-
jority of their boards; “only 39% are controlled by a majority of non-
family, non-executive members.”90 Even where such outside directors 
serve on boards, Professor Jennifer Johnson has pointed out that they 
may have close ties to the managers or a controlling shareholder: 
Whatever the efficacy of independent directors as monitors of con-
trolling shareholders in public companies, in the private arena inde-
pendence as a proxy for effective monitoring is illusory. In a private 
company, even outside directors are ordinarily selected by the in-
side managers and/or the controlling shareholder. Seldom do we en-
counter the mediating influence of a board nominating committee in 
any but the very largest of the private entities. In a closely held en-
terprise, the stockholders often even dispense with the formality of 
director elections due to the predetermined outcome of the endeav-
or. . . . [I]n many private companies, actions by a nominally inde-
pendent director that displease the majority shareholder will gener-
ally result in the swift removal of the director from the board.91 
                                                        
 86. PwC Survey Finds That Private Companies See Business Benefits in Formal Corporate 
Governance, PWC (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2012/pwc-survey-finds-
that-private-companies-see-business-benefits.jhtml. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. DELOITTE CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES: 
GOVERNANCE AND SUCCESSION PLANNING 3, 19 (2013), available at http://www.corpgov.deloitte. 
com/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/USEng/Documents/
Board%20Governance/Private%20and%20Not-for-Profit%20Organizations/Perspectives%20on% 
20Family%20Owned%20Businesses_Deloitte_June%202013.pdf (90% of this survey was private 
corporations, 10% public; 100% of respondents said the majority of the stock was owned by one or 
more family members of the original company founder). 
 90. Id. at 3. See also Frederic D. Tannenbaum, All in the Family: Governance Issues in Family-
Owned Businesses, in ALI-ABA’S PRACTICE CHECKLIST MANUAL ON ADVISING BUSINESS CLIENTS 
III: CHECKLISTS, FORMS, AND ADVICE FROM THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 122 (2004) (noting that most 
family-owned businesses have boards dominated by family members and senior management, and 
that independent directors are rare). 
 91. Johnson, supra note 81, at 270. 
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Furthermore, the large majority of family-owned businesses have 
relatively static boards, with no term limits or age limit and nearly no 
turnover of board membership in any given year.92 The family plays a 
key role in nominating and electing board members: 81% of family busi-
nesses have some family involvement.93 A small but significant number 
of family businesses use a family council or advisory board as a supple-
ment or replacement for a traditional board of directors.94 
A few examples of private company boards might help bring these 
statistics to life. In terms of absolute numbers, small and family-owned 
private companies predominate, though it can be hard to find specific 
examples of such companies’ board compositions. One well-known fam-
ily-owned private corporation, albeit quite large, is candymaker Mars, 
which has a board of directors made up of Mars family members.95 
Dell Inc., which was recently taken private, provides an example of 
a private equity-backed company board. Under the company’s capital 
structure, CEO Michael Dell is reported to own 75% of the corporate 
stock and Silver Lake Management LLC owns the remaining 25%.96  
Whereas in its public incarnation Dell had a board composed of twelve 
directors, nearly all of whom were independent outsiders besides Mi-
chael Dell, as a private company, Dell’s board reportedly consists of Mi-
chael Dell and two Silver Lake partners.97 
Cargill, Inc. provides an example of an economically large, non-
startup private company. Cargill’s board is currently composed of four-
teen members, reflecting a mix of insiders and outsiders.98 Insiders in-
clude the executive chairman, two vice-chairmen, as well as the CEO.  
Outsiders include directors who hold primary positions in other organiza-
tions and corporations such as U.S. Bancorp, Medtronic, Inc., Target 
                                                        
 92. DELOITTE CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, supra note 89, at 3, 9–10. 
 93. Id. at 8. 
 94. Id. at 3, 6–7 (19% use an advisory board; 35% “use a family council or other governing 
structure to align family interests with corporate interests”). 
 95. Karlee Weinmann & Aimee Groth, The 10 Largest Family Businesses in the U.S., BUS. 
INSIDER (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-10-largest-family-businesses-in-
america-2011-11?op=1. 
 96. Serena Saitto & Aaron Ricadela, Michael Dell and Silver Lake Will Comprise New Dell 
Board, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-17/michael-dell-
and-silver-lake-will-comprise-new-dell-board.html. 
 97 . Id.; Dell Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) (Feb. 1, 2013), available at 
http://i.dell.com/sites/doccontent/corporate/secure/en/Documents/DellInc_10K-A.pdf. 
 98. Company Overview of Cargill, Incorporated, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 15, 2014), 
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/board.asp?privcapId=103540; Cargill 
Board of Directors Elects David MacLennan Next Chief Executive Officer Effective Dec. 1; Greg 
Page to Serve as Executive Chairman, CARGILL (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.cargill.com/news/ 
releases/2013/NA3077238.jsp. 
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Corp., Delta Air Lines, Inc., Shell, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, United 
Technologies Corp., the Asia Foundation, and the San Francisco Sym-
phony.99 
In sum, the boards of non-startup private corporations are diverse, 
ranging from an effectively non-existent board to a board with outside 
directors. On the whole, these private company boards tend to be smaller 
and less independent than public company boards, and even where they 
include outside directors, such directors may have close ties to the man-
agers or a controlling shareholder. These private company boards pro-
vide a contrast to those of startup corporations discussed earlier in this 
Part, which follow a more established life cycle and evolution, often 
eventually including VCs and entrepreneurs on the board as well as in-
dependent directors in important tiebreaking positions. 
III. EXPLORING THE APPLICABILITY OF TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY 
AND THE MEDIATING HIERARCHY MODEL TO PRIVATE COMPANY 
BOARDS 
The previous Part described private company boards, highlighting 
the diversity of private corporations and the various roles of centralized 
management in such corporations over time. This Part expands on this 
background, exploring the applicability of team production theory and 
the mediating hierarchy model. Specifically, it examines the following 
ways that the mediating hierarchy model is reflected in some private 
company boards: the “hiring” or evolution of the board, the use of inde-
pendent directors, and the mediating function of the board. This Part 
concludes that Blair and Stout’s theory need not be limited to public cor-
porations and examines where the limits of their theory might instead lie 
among private corporations. 
A.  Ways That Private Company Boards Reflect the Mediating Hierarchy 
Model 
1.  The “Hiring” of the Board 
One of the first distinguishing features of Blair and Stout’s mediat-
ing hierarchy model is that it involves the team members “hiring” the 
board.100 We can observe this activity in the private company world: ad-
                                                        
 99. Company Overview of Cargill, Incorporated, supra note 98. 
 100. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 280. Cf. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE 
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 63 (2008) (“On its face, Blair and 
Stout’s scenario seems heavily influenced by the high-tech start-ups of the late 1990s. Yet, even in 
that setting, the model seems inapt. In the typical pattern, the entrepreneurial founders hire the first 
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vice from the startup community routinely trumpets the idea that the en-
trepreneur managers should carefully choose the board members, and 
therefore from which VCs to take money. For example, a partner from 
the prestigious VC firm Andreessen Horowitz explained: “The best 
board members aren’t elected by default. CEOs that set themselves up 
with their choice of board member—which means getting more than one 
term sheet and doing extensive reference checking—are better off. You 
want to find a coach, not a lever puller.”101 Similarly, the Vice President 
of Advancing Innovation at the Kauffman Foundation said: 
A lesson I acquired over the years is that some mentors and advisers 
can actually give you harmful advice. You have to be picky! Talk to 
other entrepreneurs who have scaled companies, talk to C-level ex-
ecutives who have access to the networks and experience you need. 
This is your company, and the decisions regarding advisers or board 
members is all on you—make it count.102 
One recent book aimed at advising startup entrepreneurs has entire 
chapters on the topics of “Creating Your Board” and “Recruiting Board 
Members.”103 The authors explain that creating a board of directors in-
volves a search process: “The search for a new board member, like the 
search for any addition to your team, is a process. While you typically 
will start with people you know—other entrepreneurs, your investors, 
attorneys, or recruiters—to get introductions, you shouldn’t stop 
there.”104 The process for recruiting directors continues to include inter-
viewing many people, checking references, and sometimes even having 
finalists attend a board meeting. 105  Readers are implored to consider 
more than just the money that investors bring to the table, but also the 
character and experience of the people who would be joining the board: 
As difficult as it may be, great entrepreneurs seek the right balance 
of character and capital from investors. You can compromise on the 
latter but never on the former. The art of proactively building your 
board, even as you seek to engage the best-in-class investors and in-
tegrate their capital and minds with your startup, will benefit you 
                                                                                                                            
factors of production. If the firm subsequently goes public, the founding entrepreneurs commonly 
are replaced by a more or less independent board. The board thus displaces the original promoters as 
the central party with whom all other corporate constituencies contract. In this sense, the board of 
directors—whether comprised of the founding entrepreneurs or subsequently appointed outsiders—
hires factors of production, not the other way around.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 101. FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 56. 
 102. Id. at 57. 
 103. Id. at 49, 63. 
 104. Id. at 57. 
 105. Id. at 58–59. 
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greatly in the long-term. While investors bring capital to the table, 
great board members bring capital, experience, and an emotional 
foundation to help the startup, the entrepreneurs, and the CEO suc-
ceed through the inevitable ups and downs of creating a compa-
ny.106 
Further, the importance of “hiring” the right board members is not 
just because their character and experience may prove valuable to the 
company. Hiring the right board members is also important because “in 
most cases, once you have them on the board, it’s difficult to get rid of 
them.”107 And, once the board is formed and takes on an active role, the 
possibility that the board might replace the CEO or other entrepreneur 
managers also looms on the horizon.108 Many founding entrepreneurs are 
indeed eventually replaced.109 One study found that at the time of IPO, 
43% of CEOs are non-founders.110 
This story of startup entrepreneurs taking on firm-specific invest-
ment and choosing board members who will help the company grow and 
succeed echoes the story of team production theory in corporate law. 
Blair and Stout wrote: 
In this scenario, a number of individuals come together to undertake 
a team production project that requires all to make some form of en-
terprise-specific investment. Perhaps one individual brings critical 
technical skills to the table, while another has a talent for manage-
ment, and a third provides marketing insights. They may lack finan-
cial capital, however, so they seek out wealthy friends or family 
members to put up initial funding. Thus, a team is born. Undertak-
ing team production, however, requires each of the members to 
make irrevocable investments that leave them vulnerable to oppor-
tunistic exploitation by other team members. . . . 
                                                        
 106. Id. at 25. 
 107. Id. at 31. 
 108. Cf. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 279 (“[I]f the hierarchy so decides, 
dissenting team members can be forced out of the coalition and cut off from sharing in future rents.”). 
 109. Fried & Ganor, supra note 75, at 990; William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Down-
side: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 920 n.81 (2002). 
 110. Steven N. Kaplan et al., What Are Firms? Evolution from Birth to Public Companies 4, 21 
(Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 603, 2005), available at 
http://www.aeaweb.org/assa/2006/0107_1430_0303.pdf (“Once the firm’s non-human assets are 
established, it seems possible (and not unusual) to find other people to run the firm.”); see also Mal-
colm Baker & Paul Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering, 46 
J.L. & ECON. 569, 569–98 (2003) (finding that the probability that a founder remains as CEO de-
creases as the VC’s bargaining power increases, using the VC’s reputation as a proxy for bargaining 
power). 
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Despite their mutual vulnerabilities, the team members expect for 
the most part to be able to get along with each other and figure out 
how to allocate tasks and divide up rewards as they go. When dis-
putes arise, however, they want a decisionmaking procedure in 
place that all believe will be fair. The solution? They form a public 
corporation.111 
With the exception of the last line, this quote could be the story of a 
startup at the end of its seed financing, at the time when the board chang-
es from the formality of a one or two person/founder board to a board 
reflective of different team-specific investments that have been made. 
Elsewhere, Blair and Stout argue “that hierarchs work for team members 
(including employees) who ‘hire’ them to control shirking and rent-
seeking among team members.”112 The process of entrepreneurs “creat-
ing” a board and “recruiting” board members in many ways parallels 
Blair and Stout’s description. 
And yet, it is not necessary to “form a public corporation,” as Blair 
and Stout say, to form such a board of directors—this process occurs in 
private startup corporations once they grow past the early stage and they 
take significant outside investment from VCs who negotiate for board 
seats. Further, this process of “hiring” a hierarch does not necessarily 
coincide with a decision “to go public,” as it can occur without listing 
securities on a national securities exchange, without making a registered 
public offering, and without triggering registration requirements under 
section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, which relates to the number of share-
holders of record. Indeed, with the current potential for raising money 
through large private placements and creating liquidity through private 
secondary markets,113 many private corporations prefer staying private, 
and are only “forced” to go public if they hit the section 12(g) threshold, 
which was recently raised in the JOBS Act.114 
                                                        
 111. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 275–76 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 280 (emphasis in original). 
 113. See generally Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 
91 N.C. L. REV. 745 (2013) (discussing “the dramatic expansion of the unregulated market for pri-
vate securities in the United States”); Pollman, supra note 40 (discussing private secondary mar-
kets); Craig M. Lewis, The Future of Capital Formation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (May 2, 2014, 9:02 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/05/02/the-future-
of-capital-formation/#more-62903 (“During the last calendar year, more than a trillion dollars was 
raised through private channels, including by operating companies, venture capital and private equity 
funds.”). 
 114. Pollman, supra note 40, at 192 (discussing companies forced to go public upon hitting the 
section 12(g) threshold); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 40, at 371 (“We are already at a point 
where the section 12(g) size requirement will seldom be a binding constraint in forcing a company in 
to the public status of the 1934 Act, and we may in the future find ourselves where many more com-
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In sum, the “hiring” of the board of directors occurs before the cor-
poration goes public. It is not necessarily part of a decision to go public. 
Corporate law indeed requires a board of directors in all corporations, 
public and private. Most private startups need to take significant outside 
investment to grow and bring a product to market, which brings it to the 
stage of forming a board that acts as something more than a paperwork 
formality. It is in the private company context, rather than the public one, 
that “[p]roviders of financial capital . . . are just as ‘stuck’ in the firm as 
are providers of specialized human capital.”115 
What seems additionally required, however, to truly fit Blair and 
Stout’s model is for the board to be a “disinterested hierarch.”116 It is this 
aspect of the mediating hierarchy model that separates out many—but 
not all—private corporations. 
2. The Use of Independent Directors 
Blair and Stout’s model of the mediating hierarchy is “an independ-
ent board.”117 The authors do not define this term, but suggest it is a “dis-
interested”118 board, “many of whose members are drawn from outside 
the firm.”119 “Although directors have incentives to accommodate the 
interests of all [the] groups [that make up the corporate team], they are 
under the command of none.”120 
The authors’ specification of board independence, or at least inclu-
sion of many outsiders,121 is a key reason why the mediating hierarchy 
model does not apply to many private company boards. As discussed 
above, many family-owned and private-equity backed corporations have 
effectively non-existent boards or boards that consist of directors who are 
large or controlling shareholders as well as managers of the corpora-
                                                                                                                            
panies have a size and impact comparable to a pre-2012 reporting company but can approach the 
1934 Act obligations as a voluntary choice.”). 
 115. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 277. 
 116. Id. at 284. 
 117. Id. at 251. 
 118. Id. at 284. 
 119. Id. at 252; see also id. at 276 (“This board may include several team members or their 
representatives, but it may also include (and in public corporations almost invariably does) several 
outsiders.”). 
 120. Id. at 281. 
 121. Professors Blair and Stout do not state a specific proportion of outsiders required to con-
stitute an “independent board” by their terms. For an argument that a mix of insiders and outsiders 
might be the optimal board structure, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of 
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequence of Independence and Accounta-
bility, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Be-
tween Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999). 
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tion.122  Such directors cannot be said to be free from control of the 
groups that make up the corporate team. 
However, some private corporations have a significant number of 
outside directors and there is reason to believe they function in an inde-
pendent manner.123 For instance, the Cargill board example reflects a 
board with a majority of outsiders who hold positions in respected organ-
izations from a variety of industries.124 As these boards are subject to no 
legal requirement or exchange rule to have independent directors on the 
board, they arguably reflect a mediating hierarchy as much as the princi-
pal–agent model. 
But even if one were to discount such examples as being relatively 
few in number, or such directors as being heavily influenced by the con-
centrated shareholders who elect them to the board, there are still a sig-
nificant number of private corporations that have independent directors: 
startups. Once we take account of the life cycle of startup corporations, 
we observe that when startups get beyond the seed financing stage and 
take on outside investment, they commonly add outside independent di-
rectors. 
As discussed above, one study has shown that 61% of the time VCs 
and entrepreneurs share control of the board with independent directors 
who hold the tie-breaking vote.125 Furthermore, the allocation of board 
seats over time, from the first venture capital financing to the IPO, often 
maintains the independent director or directors in an important, tie-
                                                        
 122. See, e.g., William S. Hanneman, The Case for Independence in Private Company Boards, 
ZACHERY SCOTT INV. BANKERS (2005), http://www.zacharyscott.com/insight/management/private-
company-boards.aspx (“Having worked with hundreds of private, family-owned businesses over the 
years, we have found that the vast majority does not maintain active boards of directors or advisory 
boards that could be legitimately considered as independent.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Carl Kampel, Why Privately Held and Family-Owned Businesses Should Have 
Independent Boards of Directors, FIN. EXEC. (Nov. 2012), http://www.financialexecutives.org/ 
KenticoCMS/Financial-Executive-Magazine/2012_11/Why-Privately-Held-and-Family-Owned-
Businesses-Sho.aspx#axzz2bxCaFTVn (“There are clear examples of very profitable privately held 
or family-owned businesses—with no debt to lenders or outside investors—that have independent 
boards of directors.”). 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 98 & 99; see also Caroline Daniel, Chateau Cargill 
Throws Open Its Hallowed Halls, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.iatp.org/news/chateau-
cargill-throws-open-its-hallowed-halls (discussing Cargill’s transition in the 1990s to a model with 
non-family managers and a board consisting, at the time, of “17 members: six family, six independ-
ents, and five management appointees”). 
 125. Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 76, at 288; see also Boone et al., The Determinants of 
Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis, 85 J.  FIN. ECON. 66, 90 (2007) 
(examining corporate boards post-IPO and finding that venture capital financing “has the largest 
impact on board independence”); Yael Hochberg, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the 
Newly Public Firm, 16 REV. FIN. 429, 429–480 (2012) (finding that the boards of directors of VC-
backed companies are more independent than those of similar non-VC-backed companies). 
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breaking position so that neither the entrepreneurs/founders nor VCs 
control the board: 
The median board size is 5 seats at the business plan, 7 seats at the 
IPO, and 7 at the annual report. Insiders, defined as founders and 
current or past company managers, hold a constant median of 2 
seats at each of the business plan, IPO, and annual report. VCs hold 
a median of 2 seats at the business plan, 3 at the IPO, and 1 at the 
annual report. This pattern reflects additional VC investment be-
tween the business plan and IPO, and profit-taking once the compa-
ny has issued shares to the public. Meanwhile, the board presence of 
non-VC outsiders, who are generally either industry experts and/or 
experienced executives of other firms, increases from a median of 1 
seat at the business plan to 2 at the IPO to 3 at the annual report.126 
Numerous sources from the startup community support using inde-
pendent directors as boards evolve. For example, notable VC Fred Wil-
son discussed the evolution of the Twitter board: 
Boards should evolve. . . . [A good] example is Twitter, where I was 
the first outside director, taking a board seat when Twitter was 
formed in the spinout from Obvious and [when] USV made its ini-
tial investment. Over time Twitter added several investor directors 
and then started adding independent directors. By last fall, Twitter 
had the opportunity to create a board with two founders, a CEO, 
three independent directors, and one investor director.127 
Similarly, an Andreessen Horowitz partner, Scott Weiss, explained: 
                                                        
 126. Steven N. Kaplan et al., What Are Firms? Evolution from Birth to Public Companies 26 
(Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 603, 2005), available at 
http://www.aeaweb.org/assa/2006/0107_1430_0303.pdf; see also FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 
50, at 81 (“A typical early-stage board configuration is two founders, two VCs, and one outside 
director.”); Jim Brinksma, Why Do I Need a Board of Directors and How Does It Work?, 
ALLEYWATCH (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.alleywatch.com/2013/04/why-do-i-need-a-board-of-
directors-and-how-does-it-work/ (“Expect the board of directors to be 3 or 5 people. This will con-
sist of 1 or 2 founders, 1 or 2 venture capitalists and 1 mutually agreed upon independent.”); BRAD 
FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS: BE SMARTER THAN YOUR LAWYER AND VENTURE 
CAPITALIST 63 (2d ed. 2012) (“In the case of the early stage board, there will typically be five board 
members: 1. Founder 2. CEO 3. VC 4. A second VC 5. An outside board member[.]”); Strategic 
Catalysts Inc., Best Practices, EARLY STAGE TECH BDS., http://earlystagetechboards.com/3-0-board-
composition (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (discussing the evolution of startup boards and the im-
portance of independent directors). 
 127. Fred Wilson, The Board of Directors—Selecting, Electing, & Evolving, AVC (Mar. 12, 
2012), http://avc.com/2012/03/the-board-of-directors-selecting-electing-evolving/; see also FELD & 
RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 36 (quoting Fred Wilson: “The founder should control the board, 
and independent directors should control a board where the founder does not control the company.”). 
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I’m a firm believer that neither the founders nor the VCs should 
have control of the board. My rule of thumb is that with every VC 
on the board, you should add an external, independent board mem-
ber. Often, founders get excited about some crazy idea that makes 
no sense and want to pivot the whole company around that idea.  
And VCs have various financial pressures. The founder who has 
never been in business before and a VC who is stereotypical each 
could be wrong. I counsel entrepreneurs to seek an independent 
voice on [the] board.128 
The Kauffman Foundation has published similar advice from Suren 
Dutia: 
Take special care with the composition of the board so that it in-
cludes individuals other than just the founders/CEO and major in-
vestors. This means having independent directors with no conflicts 
of interest, who can provide balanced and independent judgment, 
and who can protect the interests of all shareholders. When the Se-
ries A round for capital infusion is under way and the term sheet is 
being negotiated, it would be judicious to discuss with investors the 
board structure and rationale for having a specific number of out-
side directors. If the startup board has five members, I would rec-
ommend that at least one or two be outside or independent directors. 
In case of a seven-member board, it would be desirable to have two 
or three independent directors.129 
Why do we see such widespread use and support for independent 
directors on private company boards? Professor Brian Broughman has 
pointed out that while independent directors are often explained as serv-
ing a monitoring role in public companies with dispersed share owner-
ship, such an explanation does not make sense for startups because VCs 
are typically represented on the board and can directly monitor their in-
vestment.130 With this observation, Professor Broughman theorized that 
startups use independent directors to balance competing interests “when 
                                                        
 128. FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 35. 
 129. SUREN G. DUTIA, PRIMER FOR BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE BOARD FOR GROWING STARTUP 
COMPANIES 4 (2014), available at http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20 
reports%20and%20covers/2014/05/primer_for_building_an_effective_board.pdf; see also Eran 
Laniado, 5 Huge Mistakes Startups Make When Choosing Board Members, VENTURE BEAT (Feb. 10, 
2013), http://venturebeat.com/2013/02/10/5-huge-mistakes-startups-make-when-choosing-board-
members/ (noting a startup should “[a]ppoint at least one independent director, loyal to the company 
only”). 
 130. Broughman, supra note 53, at 498–500. He also noted that independence, in the context of 
a startup company board, refers to independence from the entrepreneurs and VCs, whereas in the 
public context independence refers to independence from management but not necessarily share-
holders. Id. 
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the owner and manager are not the same party or when there is heteroge-
neity among the group of owners (both of which occur in venture capi-
tal).”131 To support this argument, which he characterized as “a partial 
extension of Blair and Stout’s theory” to VC-backed firms, he modeled a 
VC financing contract and showed that allocating a tie-breaking vote to 
an independent director can prevent opportunistic behavior that would 
result from entrepreneur or VC control.132 The parties are effectively ced-
ing some control in order to enable the board to serve as a mediating hi-
erarchy for the team. 
These studies and pieces of expert advice show that an independent 
board is not “what makes a public corporation a public corporation,”133 
as it is not unique to public corporations. VC-backed private companies 
often develop a level of independence on the board as the company ma-
tures.134 The evolution of private company boards might in fact be one of 
the clearest illustrations of Blair and Stout’s mediating hierarchy model 
coming to life. 
3. The Mediating Function 
This Essay has shown that Blair and Stout’s story of “hiring” the 
board is reflected in many private corporations and that some of these 
private corporations—particularly startups that have evolved past the 
early seed stage—often have independent directors who serve an im-
portant role in preventing opportunistic behavior from members of the 
corporate team. One might wonder whether corporate participants actual-
ly understand the board as playing such a dispute resolution or mediating 
role135 as “an internal ‘court of appeals’ to resolve disputes that may arise 
among the team members.”136 
                                                        
 131. Id. at 501. 
 132.  Id. at 471–91 (arguing that the use of independent directors in startup firms is to “arbi-
trate” disputes between entrepreneurs and investors); see also Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, 
Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37 (2006) (arguing 
public and private firms often face the same agency problems, both inter-stakeholder and intra-
stakeholder conflicts). 
 133. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 251. 
 134. See Malcolm Baker & Paul A. Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure at the 
Initial Public Offering, 46 J.L. & ECON. 569 (2003) (finding that VC-backed firms have more inde-
pendent outside directors at IPO than other firms at IPO). 
 135. Blair and Stout refer to the “mediating” role of the board of directors as one of resolving 
disputes among team members, making decisions about the division of duties and rewards, and 
having authority to do so under corporate law. In effect, the internal governance structure of the 
board provides a mechanism for settling disputes among corporate participants. By contrast, defini-
tions of mediation in dispute resolution literature, whether in a facilitative or evaluative model, gen-
erally describe a mediator who lacks authority to impose a decision on the parties but who assists 
disputants in resolving their disagreement. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 
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Sources written by experts in the startup community indeed de-
scribe a board dynamic that fits the “mediating hierarchy” model that 
Blair and Stout espouse. For instance, two authors with investment and 
entrepreneurial experience explain: 
As a startup grows, the number of stakeholders increases. . . . Soon, 
you have a number of differing interests, some short term and some 
long term, related to the company. At times, these interests conflict 
with each other. The board ultimately is responsible for navigating 
any conflicts that arise.137 
A former founder and serial startup CEO who now serves as an in-
dependent board member describes the role as mediating in nature: 
Finally, there’s the huge benefit of constructive mediation. Too of-
ten, there are different and conflicting interests around the board-
room table. A good independent director can and should be a pow-
erful force for mediation, brokering compromises between share-
holder groups, and resolving the different views between manage-
ment and the board that inevitabl[ly] occur. The result is a board 
that can make progress without acrimony.138 
Another aspect of this mediating role is often expressed in the 
startup context in terms of the directors needing to act in the interest of 
the corporation, representing all shareholders. For instance, one VC part-
ner explained, “I have a test I use. Can I explain my decision as reasona-
ble and fair to any shareholder group, not just my own?”139 Such an 
awareness of the conflict faced by directors is common because of the 
                                                                                                                            
OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 29 (1982); see generally Lon Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971). 
 136. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 276–79. Cf. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, 
THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 64 (2008) (characterizing Blair and 
Stout’s description of the board’s dispute resolution function as inconsistent with the literature, 
which typically identifies the functions of public company boards as monitoring and disciplining top 
management, high-level strategy and policy making, and providing access to a network of contacts 
that may be useful to the business). 
 137. FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 11. 
 138 . Philip Black, The Value of an Independent Director on a Board, EXECREPS, 
http://www.execrepsinsights.com/the-value-of-an-independent-director-on-a-board/ (last visited Oct. 
25, 2014) (emphasis in original); see also GUY KAWASAKI, THE ART OF THE START: THE TIME-
TESTED, BATTLE-HARDENED GUIDE FOR ANYONE STARTING ANYTHING 138 (2004) (noting that a 
typical role that needs to be filled on a startup board is “Dad (or Mom),” who “brings a wealth of 
experience and maturity to help mediate issues and reach closure on problems”); JOHN L. WARD, 
CREATING EFFECTIVE BOARDS FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 53 (1991) (listing “balancing stakeholder 
interests” as part of the role of a private company board). 
 139. FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 12–13 (quoting August Capital partner Andy 
Rappaport). 
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known tension between preferred and common shareholders and among 
VC investors: “As a board member, a venture capitalist (VC) needs to act 
in the interest of the company, representing all shareholders, rather than 
their narrow interest as an investor.”140 As another VC partner put it, “As 
long as you are a board member, you have to focus on what is best for all 
shareholders. This can be difficult for VCs. Afterwards, you can go home 
and fret all you want about your fund not making a better return.”141 
Notably, this concern is often expressed as a duty to represent all 
shareholders, not all stakeholders—in this respect the understanding of 
the board’s role diverges from Blair and Stout’s account. In the startup 
context, however, shareholders and stakeholders are largely overlapping 
groups because founders and employees are typically granted restricted 
stock or options for common stock, VC investors hold preferred stock, 
and suppliers, lenders, and other creditors sometimes hold equity inter-
ests or warrants for stock. 
Furthermore, the fact that private company stock is not publicly 
traded may also give the board some breathing room to serve this mediat-
ing function.142 Reduced pressure to achieve quarterly earnings may al-
low the board to make trade-offs that enhance long-term firm value.143  
In addition, reputational considerations may also encourage directors to 
take multiple stakeholders’ interests into account, as many VCs and en-
                                                        
 140. Id. at 12. 
 141. Id. at 14 (quoting True Ventures managing partner Jon Callaghan). 
 142. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., 2013–2014 NACD PRIVATE COMPANY GOVERNANCE 
SURVEY (2013) (“Private companies are not held to the same level of regulatory and investor scruti-
ny as public companies, which can be an advantage for their directors.”); JOHN L. WARD, CREATING 
EFFECTIVE BOARDS FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISES 77 (1991) (“Private company boards, free from 
some of the pressures and obligations that burden public company directors, are able to fulfill some 
special opportunities to help improve corporate performance and decision making.”). Whether inves-
tors engage in short-termism that harms markets, stakeholders, and the long-term value of publicly 
traded corporations has been the subject of substantial analysis and debate. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, 
Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012) (dis-
cussing short-termism in public markets); David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911 (2013) (discussing short-termism, particularly of institutional investors, as 
an impediment to corporate social responsibility); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating 
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013) (arguing that board insulation 
does not necessarily serve long-term value). 
 143. See Alan Murray, Private Equity’s Successes Stir Up a Backlash That May Be Misdi-
rected, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2007, at A9 (suggesting that private equity firms may benefit from 
reduced short-term market pressures); Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate 
Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2011) (arguing that patient capital is needed to 
support companies creating and bringing to market innovative products and technologies, and noting 
developments that have reduced such patient capital particularly in public markets). 
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trepreneurs are repeat players in the startup community,144 as are certain 
other stakeholders like debt lenders.145 
To be sure, corporate participants also discuss other roles of the 
startup board besides the mediating role serving the corporation’s interest. 
Most notably, corporate participants expect that early-stage boards of 
directors “should be focused on being an extension of the team, helping 
the entrepreneurs out of the gate, and getting the business up and run-
ning.”146 An early-stage board should “reinforce the CEO and the entre-
preneur’s success”147 by “materially contribut[ing].”148 This support role 
includes “making numerous introductions to potential customers, part-
ners, and employee candidates,” and “being available to interview/sell 
employee candidates, coach management team members, speak at sales 
kickoffs, or just about anything reasonable that a CEO asks you to do to 
help the business.”149 
The focus on supporting the corporate team could appear in conflict 
with the idea of a mediating hierarchy that sits above the team. However, 
when understood in the context of a young startup company, this empha-
sis on being an extension of the corporate team is not necessarily incon-
sistent because it is what helps the corporation grow. A startup board 
naturally shifts its focus over the course of the corporation’s life cycle 
and may have more than one function.150 
                                                        
 144. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital 
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 257–64 (1998) (discussing reputational 
constraints on VCs); William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 919 (2002) (“By hypothesis, then, the ideal third direc-
tor has a strong reputational interest in being seen as an impartial, expert maker of good-faith busi-
ness judgments who pursues firm value from a neutral stance and is impervious to Coasian bribes.”); 
cf. D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 133, 136 (1998) (discussing the cooperative nature of the venture capital relationship and the 
conventional wisdom about reputational constraints but questioning the informational and funda-
mental efficiency of the market for reputation). 
 145. For example, Silicon Valley Bank is the largest venture lender, “the 800 pound gorilla in 
the room,” with perhaps 70% of the banks’ market share in the venture debt industry. Ibrahim, Debt 
as VC, supra note 51, at 1177. 
 146. FELD & RAMSINGHANI, supra note 50, at 81. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 56 (quoting Andreessen Horowitz partner Scott Weiss). 
 149. Id.; see also VC-BACKED COMPANY DIRECTORS WHITE PAPER, supra note 46, at 12. 
 150. See, e.g., Laniado, supra note 129 (“At early-stage startups, [board] members should 
support the management. . . . More established startups, however, may need a different type of assis-
tance related to scaling sales, engineering, logistics, and other functions that no longer fit into a 
garage.”). 
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B.  Toward a Better Understanding of Team Production Theory and  
Private Company Boards 
The discussion above shows that Blair and Stout’s team production 
theory of the board of directors as a mediating hierarchy need not be lim-
ited to public companies. The board of directors of some VC-backed 
startup companies, in particular, illustrates this point. But the above dis-
cussion also shows that, for many private companies, the board of direc-
tors does not serve as a mediating hierarchy. This raises the question: 
Why do some private corporations reflect the mediating hierarchy model 
but not others? 
This Essay concludes by offering some preliminary thoughts on this 
question. To start, one answer may be that team production problems 
simply do not arise in all corporations, and so we would not expect to 
find a mediating hierarchy model board in all corporations. To examine 
why this might be so, it is important to go back to the definition of the 
team production problem. As Blair and Stout acknowledge, in the eco-
nomic literature, team production problems arise where several types of 
resources are used, they do not all belong to one person, and the resulting 
gains are nonseparable.151 Therefore, when, for example, an individual 
provides the labor and capital to go into business herself and decides to 
incorporate, a corporation will exist that does not reflect team production. 
With general incorporation laws, the corporate form is widely availa-
ble—team production is a common economic problem, but it is not re-
quired for forming a corporation.152 The corporate form offers a variety 
of attractive characteristics, such as limited liability, that might encour-
age incorporation. 
Furthermore, even if a group of people engages in team production, 
using different resources and creating nonseparable gains, the Blair and 
Stout theory does not necessarily predict that the team members will 
adopt a mediating hierarchy. The idea of opting into the mediating hier-
archy model comes from additionally specifying that the team members’ 
contributions are firm-specific and that they face contracting problems 
because they wish to prevent shirking and rent-seeking while also allo-
                                                        
 151. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 2, at 281 (discussing Alchian and Demsetz’s 
work). 
 152. Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Or-
ganizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 426–27 (2003) (discussing states’ adop-
tion of general incorporation laws in the 19th century). It is worth noting, however, that there is a 
long history of boards existing to resolve disputes and regulate the conduct of members in merchant 
societies. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 126–28 (2004). 
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cating the surplus of the joint production to team members.153 Consider, 
for example, a group of researchers who each make a different, 
nonseparable contribution in developing a new drug. They are engaged 
in team production activity, but unless they also expect to each share in 
the gains of such team production and seek to prevent shirking and op-
portunistic-behavior, we might not expect them to give up control and 
create a mediating hierarchy. They could, however, still incorporate—
their board might simply not act as a disinterested hierarch—and if they 
did not each expect to share in the gains, they could adopt a vertical ar-
rangement in which some of the team members received fixed wages or 
compensation. 
At core, putting aside the language of “public” and “private,” Blair 
and Stout’s insights suggest that a team production problem might arise 
that would lead to adoption of a mediating hierarchy where: multiple 
team members make firm-specific investments of different types (i.e., 
labor or capital); the joint output is nonseparable; and the team members 
face contracting problems because they want to prevent shirking and op-
portunistic behavior, as well as to allocate joint output to the team mem-
bers. These conditions are indeed what we see with some VC-backed 
startups and other private companies: multiple team members are invest-
ing firm-specific labor and capital, the joint output from such contribu-
tions is nonseparable, and the team members have potentially conflicting 
claims to the surplus created.154 They either cannot guarantee all of the 
team members a fixed return because the firm is sufficiently cash-
strapped or the team members in any case want to be incentivized with a 
claim to the surplus created from the joint production. Whereas the Blair 
and Stout article seemed to assume that the parties could not use private 
arrangements to set up a mediating board (i.e., they need to go public if 
they want this), in fact team members in such startups and their repre-
sentatives are often quite sophisticated at designing governance arrange-
ments. Parties may bargain over control rights in the corporation and use 
the board as a way to create nuanced allocations of control or even a dis-
interested mediating hierarchy. While Blair and Stout’s intuition that we 
would not expect to see such a mediating hierarchy board in all corpora-
                                                        
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 20–28 (discussing Blair and Stout’s insights building 
on work by Holmstrom and Rajan and Zingales). 
 154. In other work by Margaret Blair, she provided an excellent historical example of a busi-
ness facing these conditions that chose to incorporate with a mediating hierarchy-like structure. See 
Blair, supra note 152, at 442–49 (recounting the rise of the Singer Sewing Machine Company—
started by Isaac Merritt Singer—which developed into a partnership plagued by the type of hold-up 
behavior that team production theory predicts, and then incorporated with a mediating hierarchy-like 
structure). 
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tions bears out, the potential scope of the model transcends the line 
drawn by federal securities laws between public and private corporations. 
CONCLUSION 
Few articles make a contribution of the magnitude that Professors 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout achieved in A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law. Drawing on the economic theory of team production, 
they provided a new understanding of the role of the board of directors in 
a corporation that stood in stark contrast to the conventional principal–
agent model. Instead of casting the directors as agents of the shareholders, 
Blair and Stout showed that the board of directors served as a mediating 
hierarchy that encouraged firm-specific investment in team production. 
By their account, their alternative approach provided special insight into 
the theory of public corporations. This Essay has attempted to give more 
nuanced consideration to the applicability of the team production theory 
and mediating hierarchy model to private corporations. Through exami-
nation of private company boards, both of startup corporations and other 
private corporations, this Essay shows that Blair and Stout’s theory need 
not be limited to public corporations. Indeed, the mediating hierarchy 
model is clearly evinced in the evolution of startup companies that hire a 
board of directors, use independent directors, and understand the board 
as serving a dispute resolution or mediating function among corporate 
participants. While the board of directors does not act as a mediating hi-
erarchy in all private corporations, Blair and Stout’s theory furthers our 
understanding by providing special insight into some. 
